Akamai Warns of 3 New Reflection DDoS Attack Vectors
- Threat advisory details 3 new reflection DDoS attacks observed by
Akamai's DDoS mitigation experts - Attackers unrelenting in innovative abuse of UDP services exposed to the Internet
- New DDoS attacks misuse NetBIOS name server, RPC portmap, and Sentinel licensing servers to cause denial of service outages
What is DDoS reflection?
In a reflection DDoS attack, also called a DrDoS attack, there are three types of participants: the attacker, victim servers that act as unwitting accomplices, and the attacker's target. The attacker sends a simple query to a service on a victim host. The attacker falsifies (spoofs) the query, so it appears to originate from the target. The victim responds to the spoofed address, sending unwanted network traffic to the attacker's target. Attackers choose reflection DDoS attacks where the victim's response is much larger than the attacker's query, thus amplifying the attacker's capabilities. The attacker sends hundreds or thousands of queries at high rates to a large list of victims by automated the process with an attack tool, thus causing them to unleash a flood of unwanted traffic and a denial of service outage at the target.
"Although reflection DDoS attacks are common, these three attack vectors abuse different services than we've seen before, and as such they demonstrate that attackers are probing the Internet relentlessly to discover new resources to leverage," said
The attack tools for each of the new reflection attacks are related – they are all modifications of the same C code. Each attack vector requires the same basic recipe – a script that sends a spoofed request to a list of victim reflectors. The command-line options are similar.
NetBIOS name server reflection DDoS attack
The NetBIOS reflection DDoS attack – specifically NetBIOS Name Service (NBNS) reflection – was observed by
This attack generates 2.56 to 3.85 times more response traffic sent to the target than the initial queries sent by the attacker.
RPC portmap reflection DDoS attack
The first RPC portmap reflection DDoS attack observed and mitigated by
The largest responses had an amplification factor of 50.53. A more common amplification factor was 9.65. Of the four RPC reflection attack campaigns mitigated by
Sentinel reflection DDoS attack
The first Sentinel reflection DDoS attack was observed in
The amplification factor for this attack is 42.94, however only 745 unique sources of this attack traffic have been identified. Even with the extra bandwidth afforded by servers in well-connected networks, an attack of this type is limited by the number of reflectors available. One such attack peaked at 11.7 Gbps.
DDoS mitigation and system hardening
For all three attack vectors, upstream filtering can be used for DDoS mitigation where possible, otherwise a cloud-based DDoS mitigation service provider will be needed. The threat advisory provides a Snort mitigation rule to detect malicious queries generated by the RPC portmap attack tool. Similar rules can be made to detect the Sentinel service.
"For all three services, admins should ask if the service needs to be exposed to everyone on the Internet," said Sholly. "For NetBIOS, the answer is probably no. For the other two the answer may be yes, and the issue then becomes how to protect them. RPC and Sentinel traffic can be monitored with an intrusion detection system."
To learn more about these reflection DDoS threats and DDoS mitigation techniques, please download a complimentary copy of the threat advisory at www.stateoftheinternet.com/3-ddos-reflection
About
As the global leader in Content Delivery Network (CDN) services,
Note: All product and company names are trademarks of their respective organizations.
|
Contacts: |
||
|
Rob Morton |
--or-- |
Tom Barth |
|
Media Relations |
Investor Relations |
|
|
617-444-3641 |
617-274-7130 |
|
Logo - http://photos.prnewswire.com/prnh/20100225/AKAMAILOGO
To view the original version on PR Newswire, visit:http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/akamai-warns-of-3-new-reflection-ddos-attack-vectors-300167290.html
SOURCE
